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1 Introduction
Exit and contraction decisions are an important part of a firm’s strategic
planning as much as investment and expansion policies. A number of fac-
tors related to the states of the economy and the industry as well as to the
firm characteristics can contribute to a firm’s exit decision from its prod-
uct market. For instance, firms may be operating in mature industries in
which demand may be shrinking, rendering firms unable to cover their costs.
Likewise, a recessionary period may lead a firm to experience difficulties it
has not encountered in a boom period with high asset values.1 Industry
concentration and firm characteristics can be another crucial factor in the
exit decision. In an oligopolistic market, for example, a firm may engage
in predatory pricing, in expectation of inducing higher exit probability of
a weaker competitor (see Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) and Klemperer
(1995)). In sum, exit decisions can be attributed to a complex interplay of
several factors ranging from the aggregate to the individual firm level.
Firm characteristics can be perceived as a channel through which macroe-
conomic conditions and industry factors determine the exit decision. The
same economic factors will affect firms differently as they exhibit cross-
sectional asymmetries. One important firm characteristic is the financial
structure. Over the past two decades, there has been a surge in interest
in the relationship between product market competition, on the one hand,
and capital structure on the other hand. Some theoretical models such as
those of Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1988) predict a more
1Part of the difficulties experienced by firms in the current financial and economic
turmoil can be ascribed to the fact that while asset values have suffered considerably in
value their stock of debt has remained in place.
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aggressive competitive behavior as a result of higher leverage while others2
show that leverage makes product market competition softer. The relation-
ship has also come under scrutiny in the empirical literature that focuses
on pricing and exit decisions. Chevalier (1995), for example, explores the
effect of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) on the pricing in the supermarket indus-
try. She finds that in markets in which rival firms are also highly leveraged,
prices rise following the LBO.3 She also finds evidence of predatory pricing in
markets in which the LBO firm faces less leveraged rivals. Similarly, Phillips
(1995) and Phillips and Kovenock (1997) investigate the effect of large re-
capitalizations on the subsequent product market performance and survival
of firms. They find that firms that have undergone a large recapitalization
are less likely to invest and more likely to shut down plants.
Although understanding the role of financial leverage in pricing and exit
decisions is important, the picture remains inherently incomplete without
understanding the link between firm efficiency and financial leverage and
its implications for firm exit decisions. Dun and Bradstreet (1980) report,
for instance, that about 90% of business failures in the United States and
Canada relate to firm inefficiencies. More recently, studies by Zingales (1998)
and Khanna and Tice (2005) present evidence that both factors are crucial
in product market pricing and exit decisions. Zingales (1998) investigates
firm survival in the trucking industry around the exogenous shock of the
1979 deregulation. He points to the role of capital market imperfections
and shows evidence that high leverage increases the probability of exit 8
years after the deregulation, particularly in the more imperfectly competi-
2See, for instance, Poitevin (1898), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Dasgupta and
Titman (1998)
3This is consistent with the theoretical literature that predicts a softer product market
competition as leverage increases. Competition can be considered to be soft if the expected
price to cost margin is relatively high.
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tive segment of the industry. Interestingly, although efficiency and survival
probability are positively related, he also finds that efficient high-debt firms
leave the market after a negative shock. His study ties the negative effect
of leverage to the reduced investment and the post-deregulation induced
price war. Similarly, Khanna and Tice (2005) explore the exit and pricing
decisions of discount stores across business cycles. They present evidence
that confirm a positive relation between financial leverage and probability of
exit and a negative relation between efficiency and probability of exit. The
interesting result in Khanna and Tice (2005) is that, during recessions, effi-
cient highly leveraged firms are more likely to exit the market. Like Zingales
(1998), Khanna and Tice (2005) relate this finding to the price cutting be-
havior of the rivals in markets with heterogeneously levered firms. In sum,
both papers demonstrate the importance of capital market imperfections:
these imperfections can lead to the exit of the otherwise ”fit” firms out of
the product markets.
In this paper, I propose a real options model of imperfect competition
with asymmetric information that analyzes a firm’s exit decision. The deci-
sion to exit is linked to macroeconomic factors such as the level of interest
rates, industry characteristics such as demand growth and volatility as well
as to firm characteristics represented by financial leverage and firm efficiency.
Importantly, I investigate the impact of information asymmetry as part of
industry characteristics. Information asymmetry, particularly in concen-
trated industries, is a crucial factor that impacts the strategic behavior of
incumbent firms. Firms form their competitive strategies conditioning on
the amount of information they are able to gather about their rivals. In the
model, firms update their conjectures based on the actions of their rivals.
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Given these conjectures, firms optimally choose when to exit the market.
The model links this exit decision to firm leverage. However, I define firm
leverage more broadly as the sum of financial leverage and operating lever-
age. Operating leverage arises due to the fixed costs incurred to continue
operations. I use operating leverage as the efficiency parameter: an efficient
firm has a lower operating leverage, ceteris paribus. Using this specification
allows me to capture the idea that high financial leverage and high ineffi-
ciency are the measures of firm weakness and make the firm more likely to
exit market, as documented in the literature. It also allows me to define var-
ious competitive environments based on firms’ relative strength. Different
competitive environments, in turn, have different equilibrium implications.
There are several interesting results that emerge from the model. First,
I show that, under certain competitive environments, rival actions reveal
private information.4 The information revelation allows the stronger firm
in terms of total firm leverage to outlive its competitor. At the same time,
without conditioning on business cycles, the model does capture the Khanna
and Tice (2005) evidence that high-debt efficient firm can be driven out of
the market. I show that this is the case so long as the portion of total
firm leverage accounted for by debt is above a certain threshold, which, in
turn, depends on the total leverage of the product market rivals. This new
finding has important implications for the capital structure choice of firms in
concentrated industries. In particular, the relation implies that a firm’s debt
capacity is a function of its rivals’ leverage. To the best of my knowledge,
this is a new prediction in the literature.
4In the context of real options, information revelation through option exercise is not a
new idea. In another seminal work, Grenadier (1999) addresses the issue of information
revelation through option exercise to explain information cascades.
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Second, I derive the equilibrium conditions under which information rev-
elation breaks down and devise an equilibrium that supports the exit of the
stronger firm. This result is particularly important as it raises the possibil-
ity that informational asymmetries can prove to be crucial in the outcome
of product market competition. The result relies on the ability of a weaker
firm to imitate a stronger firm. This ability is linked to the competitive en-
vironment. In a sense, this result augments the empirical finding of Zingales
(1998), predicting that not only the ”fittest” and the ”fattest” but also the
most informationally advantageous firms survive.
Third, the model illustrates the conditions under which capital structure
can be used as a strategic tool to signal information. Specifically, the model
shows that a sufficiently less levered firm can increase its financial leverage
to avoid imitation by a weaker firm. For signaling to take place without
distorting the competitive position, the firm must have a significant edge
over the rival in terms of either efficiency (i.e. operating leverage) or financial
leverage. This result has important ramifications for the ex ante capital
structure choice of the firms. Specifically, it implies that a firm should also
take its competitive position into account when designing financial contracts.
The model is also related to the literature pioneered by Berk, Green, and
Naik (1999) that ties firms’ investment and growth options to asset prices
and returns. While most of these studies5 focus on the role of growth op-
tions, little attention has been given to the role of disinvestment and/or
exit decisions.6 The literature offers rational explanations for the of book-
5See, among others, Kogan (2004), Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003), Cooper and
Priestley (2008) and Aguerrevere (2008).
6Carlson, Dockner, Fisher, and Giammarino (2009) and Cooper (2003) are notable
exceptions.
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to-market (B/M) and size effects documented by Fama and French (1992).
In Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004), for example, the B/M effect
arises due to the fixed operating costs porportional to the firm capital. I
contribute to this literature by modeling exit decisions and incorporating
financial leverage and information asymmetry. I also derive the implications
for the firms’ cost of capital. The model demonstrates that information
asymmetry leads to jumps in firm value as well as risk dynamics and cost
of capital. While the size of jumps depends on the extent of information
asymmetry, the direction depends on industry characteristics. Specifically,
the presence of competition has a tempering effect when the industry de-
mand falls. At the same time, the presence of competition prevents a firm
from capturing the monopoly rents. This tradeoff determines the direction
of the jump. In addition, the model predicts that actions taken by prod-
uct market rivals in concentrated industries are a risk factor and should
be taken into account when assesssing expected returns. The intuition for
this follows from the fact that information asymmetry and rival actions can
potentially change the market structure. This, in turn, has impact on cash
flows expected to be generated by the firm.
The paper fits naturally into the products markets and game theoretic
real options literatures. Although these strands of literature focus more on
investment decisions, there are papers that model exit decisions. Ghemawat
and Nalebuff (1985) develop the equilibrium concept in a Cournot setting in
which firms have different market shares and show that the firm with longer
potential monopoly tenure outlasts its rival(s). The equilibrium concept
of this paper resembles Ghemawat and Nalebuff’s idea. Closely related to
our paper is the study of Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). As in this article,
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they model exit decisions with incomplete information. However, they do
not consider signaling possibilities to resolve the asymmetric information.
A model that does consider the effect of capital structure choice on entry
and exit decisions is that of Lambrecht (2001). He explores the strategic
impact of debt in a duopoly and shows that debt renegotiation can pro-
vide competitive advantage. The model developed in this paper builds on
the model developed in Lambrecht (2001). The main difference between his
model and the model presented here is that Lambrecht analyzes a setting
with complete information. More recently, Murto (2004) and Miltersen and
Schwartz (2007) develop models of exit decisions. While the former incorpo-
rates a richer set of exit strategies, the latter analyzes not only exit decisions
but also switching options. In this paper, I consider simple strategies and
instead focus more on the use of debt as a strategic tool. The paper also
relates to those of Grenadier (1999) and Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003).
Although these papers present models of investment rather than divestment
decisions, they deal with incomplete information and demonstrate that the
state variable carries information on which firms can base their strategies.
The informative role of the state variable is a crucial factor for the exit
decision in the model presented here. However, the model also shows how
the informative nature of the state variable can break down and how capital
structure decisions can substitute in terms of information revelation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model and derives the equilibria of interest. In Section 3, the model is
analyzed further through simulations. Economic implications and testable
hypotheses are also discussed in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes the
paper.
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2 The Model
2.1 Assumptions
For parsimony, the model is set up as a duopoly in reduced form. Both
firms are assumed to have no further growth opportunities but they can
exit the market. One can, therefore, think of two firms operating in a
mature industry such as the airlines industry. The firms employ assets in
their operations with salvage value Si > 0, i = 1, 2. The salvage value of
assets can be thought of as part of the opportunity cost of continuing to
operate in the industry. When equityholders find that the opportunity cost
of continuation is too high, they will leave the market. The salvage value
can also be perceived as the fire sale value of assets. A firm with a higher
salvage value, therefore, can be expected to leave the market sooner, ceteris
paribus, since its assets command a higher price in the market. Since the
focus of the model is the relation between leverage, exit and information
asymmetry, I assume that both firms have the same salvage value fixed at
S.
The assets of a firm generate an operating income of Πxt (πxt) if the
firm operates as a monopolist (duopolist). The model assumes Π > π > 0,
implying monopoly rents for the firm that outlasts its rival. This structure
gives the firms the incentive to drive competitors out of the market. The
state variable, xt is stochastic and can be thought of as the demand shocks.
It follows a standard geometric Brownian motion:
dxt = μxtdt + σxtdwt (1)
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where μ, σ are constant drift and volatility terms and dwt are the increments
of a standard Wiener process. We assume that the drift term, μ, is strictly
less than the riskless rate, r, to guarantee finite firm values.7
Both firms are initially assumed to be leveraged. Leverage is also the
main source of heterogeneity across firms. Firm leverage in the model has
two components. First, each firm has financial leverage. Financial leverage
entails the payment of a fixed coupon, ci, as long as the firm operates in
the market. Though not modeled explicitly, the coupon is set such that the
market value of debt at the initial date, D(x0; ci) is equal to its face value,
B. When exit occurs, a portion α ∈ [0, 1] of the salvage value is lost. Capital
structure is taken as a static decision of the firm. This implies, in particular,
that bondholders have a fixed claim on the firm in which seniority plays no
role and that the value of debt remains unaffected when the rival firm exits
the market.8 Finally, the model does not consider any restrictive covenants
and renegotiation possibilities.
The second component of firm leverage is the operating leverage. Oper-
ating leverage is defined as the fixed costs the firms must incur to continue
to compete and proxies firm efficiency. These costs may arise due to supply
chain management, location and facilities choice and organizational factors
such as the efficiency of production processes and networks. Although op-
erating leverage relates to the real decisions of the firm, it is analogous to
the financial leverage in that it represents a fixed outlay from the firm. Just
7The initial value of the state variable, x(0) = x0 is assumed to be sufficiently high so
that the initial setting is a duopoly.
8It could be argued that debt value should also be affected by the exit of the rival firm
since this enables the firm to generate higher operating profits, which, in turn, might lead
to a higher debt capacity. However, given the assumption of a static capital structure,
only the own firm actions will influence the debt value.
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as with the debt contract, equityholders are residual claimants as they must
first pay out any fixed costs. I assume that information asymmetry in the
model relates to the operating leverage. For expositional purposes, infor-
mation asymmetry is not taken as reciprocal. That is, I assume that the
fixed cost of firm 1, f1, is common knowledge in the market. On the other
hand, firm 1 knows only the distribution of the fixed costs of the rival firm
2. There is no other source of information asymmetry in the model. For
simplicity, the fixed cost of firm 2 can be either low or high:
f˜2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
fL, with p
fH , with q ≡ 1− p
Having described both components, total leverage of a firm can now be
defined as the sum of these two parts. For firm 1, F1 = c1 +f1 denotes total
leverage. Total leverage of firm 2, on the other hand, is given by:
F˜2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
c2 + FL, with p
c2 + FH , with q ≡ 1− p
Murto (2004) develops a theory of exit in an oligopoly under the assump-
tion that the strategy space need not be connected sets as in Lambrecht
(2001). In such a setting, firms can also exit the market with an upward
movement of the state variable. In this paper, I restrict attention to strate-
gies in which exit is triggered by a single threshold. This allows me to keep
the model as simple as possible since, as Murto (2004) demonstrates, re-
laxing the connectedness assumption may under certain conditions result in
multiple equilibria.
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2.2 Real Options and Information Revelation
I start this section with the analysis of various claims on the firm to obtain
total firm values. In the model, there are two groups of claimholders. The
first group is the bondholders. The debt contract is a consol bond and
promises bondholders a fixed payment of cidt unless equityholders decide
to exit the market. The value of the debt contract,therefore, comprises two
parts. The first part is the present value of the cash flow streams represented
by the coupon payments. The second component is associated with the
flexibility of equityholders to determine the exit policy of the firm. This
part captures the fact that, at firm exit, bondholders give up the stream of
coupon payments and instead get a claim on the remaining value of the firm
as the senior claimholders.
The second group of claimholders is the equityholders. The value of eq-
uity depends on the industry structure. To analyze equity value, therefore,
assume, for now, that firm i eventually becomes the monopolist and firm j
leaves the market at some optimal trigger value xjd. The equity value for
firm i is divided into two regions separated by the exit trigger of the rival.
In each region, firm i continues to pay out Fi. However, when it operates as
a duopolist, it generates an operating income of πxt while, as a monopolist,
operating revenues are Πxt. Firm j, on the other hand, acts as a duopolist
until its own exit. Therefore, its equity value can be characterized in a single
region above its exit trigger, generating a net flow of πxt−Fj. Proposition 1
formalizes the above discusssion.
Proposition 1: (i) Debt value of both firms is given by:
Dk(x; ck) =
ck
r
+ Akxλ2 , k ∈ {i, j} (2)
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where λ2 < 0 is the root of the characteristic equation described in the Ap-
pendix and
Ak =
⎧⎨
⎩
0, if (1− α)S ≥ ckr[
(1− α)S − ck
r
]( 1
xk
)λ2
, otherwise
(3)
where xk, k = i, j is the exit trigger of firm k.
(ii) Equity value of the firm that leaves the market first, firm j, is given by:
Ej(x) =
(
πx
r − μ −
Fj
r
)
+
(
ωj(1− α)S + Fj
r
− πxjd
r − μ
)(
x
xjd
)λ2
=
(
πx
r − μ −
Fj
r
)
+ Bjxλ2 (4)
where xjd is optimally derived as:
xjd =
−λ2(r − μ)(ωj(1− α)rS + Fj)
(1− λ2)rπ (5)
and ωj(cj) is the portion of the salvage value recovered by equityholders after
paying bondholders:
ωj(cj) =
{
(1− α)− cj
rS
, if (1− α)S ≥ cjr
0, otherwise
(6)
(iii) Equity value of the firm that becomes a monopolist, firm i, is given by:
Ei(x) =
{
Eid(x), if t < τj
Eim(x), otherwise
(7)
where τj ≡ inf {t > 0 : xt ≤ xjd} is defined as the stopping time at which
firm j leaves the market and E1d(x) and E1m(x) are determined, respectively,
as:
Eid(x) =
(
πx
r − μ −
Fi
r
)
+
(
ωi(1− α)S + Fi
r
− Πxim
r − μ
)(
x
xim
)λ2
+
[
(Π− π)xjd
r − μ
(
x
xjd
)λ2]
=
(
πx
r − μ −
Fi
r
)
+ Cixλ2 + Dxjd
(
x
xjd
)λ2
(8)
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Eim(x) =
(
Πx
r − μ −
Fi
r
)
+
(
ωi(1− α)S + Fi
r
− Πxim
r − μ
)(
x
xim
)λ2
=
(
Πx
r − μ −
Fi
r
)
+ Cixλ2 (9)
where the exit trigger for firm i, xim, is given by:
xim =
−λ2(r − μ)(ωi(1− α)rS + Fi)
(1− λ2)rΠ (10)
(iv) Total firm value for firm k is given by:
Vk(x) = Dk(x) + Ek(x), k ∈ {i, j} (11)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 19 details the structure and various factors that determine
the value of debt and equity claims of the firms. Debt value consists of two
parts as shown in equation (2). The first part is the present value of the fixed
claim of bondholders on the firm. The second component, Akxλ2, captures
the value associated with the flexibility of equityholders to choose the time of
exit. From equation (3), this value depends on whether the salvage value of
firm assets net of bankruptcy costs, (1−α)S, is sufficient to cover the present
value of coupon payments, ckr . If this is the case, then bondholders recover
their claim in full when the firm exits. In other words, the debt contract is
riskless and therefore, the value of debt is simply the present value of coupon
payments. If, on the other hand, (1 − α)S < ckr , bondholders give up the
present value of coupon payments but capture fully the salvage value after
accounting for the proportional loss, α. This is represented by the bracketed
term in equation (3).
9Proposition 1 of this paper is analogous to Proposition 2 of Lambrecht (2001). Propo-
sition 1 generalizes Lambrecht’s Proposition 2 to include operating leverage and salvage
value.
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As for the equity value, consider first firm j, which leaves the market
first. Its equity value is composed of three parts. First, the firm generates
operating revenues, πxt. The first term captures the present value of this
revenue stream discounted at the risk-adjusted rate. The firm must also pay
out the present value of fixed claims coming from financial and operating
leverage. This is captured by the second term. Together, these two parts
comprise the value of assets in place net of fixed obligations of the firm. The
final term in equation (4) characterizes the additional value associated with
the flexibility of equityholders to leave the market. Analogous to the debt
contract, at the exit trigger, xjd, equityholders give up the present value of
the assets in place and instead retrieve the salvage value of the assets.
The equity value of firm i comprises of two regions reflecting the product
market structure as shown in equation (7). In the region in which firm j has
not yet exited, firm i operates as duopolist. Therefore, its value comprises
the same elements as those in the equity value of firm j. The duopoly
equity value, however, is further enhanced by the strategic interaction. In
particular, the last term in equation (8) captures the incremental benefit
that accrues to firm i when firm j exits the market at xjd. Once firm j
leaves the market, firm i’s operating revenues jump by a factor Ππ and the
strategic effect disappears in equation (9), which captures the firm i value
as a monopolist.
The analysis in Proposition 1 is silent on which firm leaves the market
first. In what follows, I address this issue by considering various cases based
on relative strength of the firms. The analysis includes cases in which infor-
mation revelation occurs with strategic exercise of options as well as those
cases in which information revelation can break down. In the subsequent
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analysis, the uninformed firm 1 is said to strictly dominate the informed
firm 2 of type k if F1 < Fk, k = L,H. Conversely, type k firm 2 strictly
dominates firm 1 if Fk < F1, k = L,H. In the case FL < F1 < FH , no
dominance occurs ex ante. Given these competitive environments, each firm
optimally determines when to exit the market based on its information set.
In particular, the uninformed firm 1 can choose to leave either at its duopoly
exit trigger, x1d or at the monopoly exit trigger x1m. The triggers x1d and
x1m are given, respectively by xjd and xim in Proposition 1 with the appro-
priate firm-specific parameters. Similarly, a type k firm 2 must determine
whether it exits at the duopoly trigger, xk2d or at the monopoly trigger, x
k
2m.
Proposition 1 shows that all exit triggers are strictly increasing in the total
leverage of the firm. A higher firm leverage compared to the competitor,
therefore, implies that the firm exits the market sooner than the rival in
a frictionless environment. In terms of the information sets, knowing rival
firm leverage is equivalent to knowing the exit trigger.
Before analyzing these cases, it is crucial to define the concepts of reser-
vation trigger, which plays an important role in deriving the subsequent
equilibria, and revelation strategy. As in Lambrecht (2001), the reservation
trigger is the critical threshold of the competitor that makes firm i indiffer-
ent between becoming a monopolist at this trigger and leaving first at its
own duopoly threshold. Figure 1 shows firm 1 duopoly value function for
various levels of duopoly exit trigger of type L firm 2. Note that the value
function is increasing in the exit trigger of the competitor. Put differently,
the sooner firm 2 leaves, the higher is the value of firm 1 since it has a shorter
duopoly but a longer monopoly position. The existence of the reservation
trigger is guaranteed by this feature and the fact that the value functions
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Figure 1: Duopoly Firm 1 Value as a Function of Type L Firm 2 Duopoly Trigger.
The parameters are μ = 0, σ = 0.2, r = 0.05,Π = 2, π = 1, S = 1, f1 = 0.1. The
reservation trigger with this parameter set is x1r = 0.05
are of the same shape. Specifically, the reservation triggers for firm 1 and
type k firm 2, respectively, are the critical value of competitor’s duopoly
threshold such that
Ek1d(x1r) = E1d(x1d) (12)
E¯k2d(x2r) = E
k
2d(x
k
d) (13)
In equations (12) and (13), the left-hand-side is the value of the firm that
eventually becomes a monopolist at the competitor’s exit trigger. The right-
hand-side yields the value when leaving first at the duopoly trigger. Sub-
stituting for equations (12) and (13) from the analysis in Proposition 1, the
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reservation triggers can be obtained as:
x1r =
{
(ω1(1− α)rS + F1)(r − μ)
(Π− π)(1− λ2)r
(
1
xλ21d
− 1
xλ21m
)} 1
1−λ2
xkr =
{
(ωk(1− α)rS + Fk)(r − μ)
(Π− π)(1− λ2)r
(
1
(xkd)λ2
− 1
(xkm)λ2
)} 1
1−λ2
(14)
As in Lambrecht (2001), the reservation trigger can be perceived as the
point until which firm i is willing to incur losses to reap off monopoly benefits
when the competitor leaves the market. Furthermore, substituting for the
exit triggers in equation (14), it turns out that the reservation trigger is
linearly increasing in the firm’s total leverage. The reservation trigger can
be written generically as:
xir =
(r − μ)
(1− λ2)r
[
πλ2 −Πλ2
(−λ2)λ2(Π− π)
] 1
1−λ2
(ωi(1− α)rS + Fi)
=
(r − μ)
(1− λ2)rΩ(ωi(1− α)rS + Fi) (15)
Equation (15) allows us to make a natural order among reservation trig-
gers. This simplifies the derivation of the equilibrium. In addition, the reser-
vation trigger has the feature that it is between the duopoly and monopoly
thresholds, xim  xir  xid, i = 1, 2.
I now turn to the discussion of the revelation strategy. The revelation
strategy for the uninformed firm 1 aims to induce the rival firm to truth-
fully reveal its type through its actions. Since the action space for firm 2
involves exiting at either the duopoly or the monopoly triggers, the revela-
tion strategy leads a type H firm 2 to exit at xH2d, implying that the exercise
(or the lack thereof) of the exit option dissipates the information asymmetry
in the product markets. Note that firm 1 can devise a revelation strategy
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using the reservation trigger. Since the reservation trigger measures a firm’s
willingness to endure losses in order to become a monopolist, a lower reser-
vation trigger can serve as a credible threat mechanism and force the H type
firm to truthfully reveal its type.
Having defined the concepts of the reservation trigger and the revelation
strategy, Proposition 2 establishes one of the main results of the paper in
the non-dominance case: that information revelation in product markets can
follow from strategic exercise of real options.
Proposition 2 (Information Revelation): Suppose FL < F1 < FH and
x1d < x
H
2r. Then the unique separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)
involves type L firm 2 leaving the market at its monopoly trigger and type
H firm 2 exiting when xt hits xH2d. Firm 1 plays the revelation strategy in
which it observes the firm 2 action at xH2d. Firm 1 leaves the market either
at its duopoly trigger if firm 2 has not exited at xH2d or exits at the monopoly
trigger if firm 2 has exited at xH2d.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The significance of Proposition 2 stems from the fact that real options
exercises carry information. This information can be crucial so as to resolve
information asymmetry and to determine the outcome of product market
competition. Three remarks are in order here. First, although information
revelation ensures that the stronger firm in terms of total leverage outlives
the competitor, it does capture the possibility that the exit is due to high
debt rather than operating inefficiency. Suppose that firm 1 faces a type L
firm 2 and that f1 < fL. Firm 1 leaves the market due to relatively high
financial leverage if c1 − c2 > fL − f1.
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Second, it is important to realize that Proposition 2 claims the separating
PBE is unique. The uniqueness of the PBE arises from the observation that
the firms play their dominant strategies given the parameter assumptions
in Proposition 2. In particular, a type H firm has no incentive to pool with
the type L firm since the duopoly trigger of firm 1 is below its reservation
trigger, xH2r. Hence, even if firm 1 is misled to believe that the competitor is
an L type firm, the exit at x1d would lead to unjustified losses beyond the
indifference point of the H type firm.
Finally, note that a full solution to the game describes what firms will do
for each possible parameter set, in particular, also when x1d ≥ xH2r. Following
the strategy outlined in Proposition 2 when x1d ≥ xH2r for the uninformed
firm 1 gives the high-leverage firm 2 the incentive to stay in the market
beyond its duopoly exit trigger. To see this, suppose that the state variable
hits xH2d. By staying until x
H
2d − ,  > 0, the inefficient firm leads firm 1 to
believe that it faces a low-leverage rival and therefore, it leaves the market
at x1d. Since x1d ≥ xH2r, the high-leverage firm is willing to incur these
losses since it will eventually become a monopolist. Hence, the equilibrium
of Proposition 2 breaks down when x1d ≥ xH2r. On the other hand, since
the parameters of the game are known at the outset, firm 1 knows whether
or not x1d ≥ xH2r. The fact that the game is played in triggers implies firm
1 could devise another revelation strategy. If the expected payoff from the
revelation strategy is greater than that from exiting at the duopoly trigger,
firm 1 will adopt the revelation strategy. The revelation strategy when
x1d ≥ xH2r involves waiting until just after the reservation trigger of type H
firm 2, xH2r − . If firm 1 commits10 to this strategy, the best response of
a type H firm 2 would be to leave at the duopoly trigger. A type L firm
10Firm 1 can credibly commit to the strategy since x1r < x
H
2r.
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2 would wait until firm 1 leaves since xL2r < x1r. Note, however, that firm
1’s commitment to this strategy depends crucially on the beliefs it holds as
to the type of the rival upon observing no exit at the trigger xH2d. Denote
by r the conditional probability that firm 1 faces an L type rival given no
exit has occurred at xH2d. If firm 1 exits first at the duopoly trigger, its
expected equity value would be given by E1d(x) as specified in equation
(4). On the other hand, the revelation strategy yields an expected value
of rE1d(x;xH2r) + (1 − r)EH1d(x). In this formulation, E1d(x;xH2r) denotes
the firm 1 value when equityholders exit at the reservation trigger of the
H type rival, xH2r, while E
H
1d(x) is the value to equityholders when the rival
firm turns out to be an H type firm and exits at xH2d − ,  > 0. The latter
is given by equation (8). The next proposition shows that if the expected
value from the duopoly strategy exceeds that from the revelation strategy,
there exists indeed an equilibrium in which the high-leverage firm induces
the uninformed firm 1 to exit the market prematurely by taking advantage
of the information asymmetry.
Proposition 3: Suppose FL < F1 < FH and x1d ≥ xH2r. If firm 1’s prior
on an L type rival, p, satisfies
p ≥ E
H
1d(x)− E1d(x)
EH1d(x)− E1d(x;xH2r)
(16)
then there exists a PBE in which firm 1 leaves the market first at its duopoly
trigger x1d.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 is another central result of the paper. For the result in
Proposition 3 to prevail, the uninformed firm’s prior about an L type rival
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must be sufficiently high. When this is the case, firm 1 prefers to leave the
market first at its duopoly trigger. The distortionary effect of information
asymmetry may occur in a number of competitive settings and industry
characteristics. For instance, one may expect information asymmetry to be
particularly high in R&D intensive industries in which firms may want to
conceal private information in order to gain competitive advantage over the
rival. Information about a new entrant may also be scarce for an incumbent
firm.
The proposition shows a more efficient, low-debt firm can be driven out
of the market. In a sense, this result entails the evidence in Khanna and
Tice (2005) that a more efficient firm with high debt can be driven out of
the market earlier than a relatively less efficient rival with lower financial
leverage. At the same time, it is more general than the evidence in Khanna
and Tice (2005) since it shows that information asymmetry can cause the
exit of the stronger firm in the market.
Turning to the cases of strict dominance, Proposition 4 establishes that
as long as there is strict dominance between firms, information revelation
always takes place.
Proposition 4: (i) When F1 < Fk, k = L,H, the unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium involves firm 2 of type k = L,H leaving the market first. Type
k firm equity value and the exit trigger are given by equations (4) and (5),
respectively. The equity value of firm 1 is given by:
E1 =
⎧⎨
⎩
pEL1d(x) + qE
H
1d(x), if t < τH
EL1d(x), t ∈ [τH , τL]
E1m(x), otherwise
(17)
where τk, k = L,H is the adapted stopping time at which type k firm 2 exits.
Firm 1 exit trigger is as in equation (10).
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(ii) When Fk < F1, k = L,H, the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in-
volves firm 2 of type k = L,H leaving the market last. Type k firm equity
value and the exit trigger are given by equations (7) and (10), respectively.
Firm 1 equity value and exit trigger are given by equations (4) and (5),
respectively.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Similar to the previous results, Proposition 4 shows that total leverage
determines the order of exit in product markets. As opposed to Proposition
3, however, it argues that information asymmetry cannot be taken advantage
of and that it is immaterial to the outcome of competition. So long as there
is strict dominance between firms, the state variable and the exercise of
real options reveal private information. Similar to Proposition 2, the exit
in strict dominance cases might result either from operating inefficiency or
relatively high debt.
2.3 Capital Structure and Information Revelation
The previous subsection discussed how information revelation can occur
and break down in product markets with strategic exercise of real options.
The focus of this subsection is how firms can make use of their capital
structure to reveal their private information. The analysis up to this section
considered cases in which the relations among total leverages of firms were
strict inequalities.
However, it may be the case that the total leverage of firm 1, F1, is equal
to that of type H firm 2, FH . When this is the case, the reservation triggers
of firm 1 and type H firm 2 are equal. Neither firm, therefore, can credibly
threaten the rival by staying until their respective reservation triggers. The
uninformed firm 1 would then compare its expected payoff from exiting at its
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duopoly trigger to that from exiting at its monopoly trigger. If parameters
are such that the expected payoff from the monopoly strategy exceeds that
from the duopoly strategy, firm 1 would then stay in the market until its
monopoly trigger. This would, in turn, give the L type rival to separate
itself from an H type firm.
How does capital structure reveal information? Since the competitive en-
vironment is determined by the firm-specific and market-wide characteristics
known to both firms at the outset of the game,11 a type L firm 2 knows the
best response function of the uninformed firm 1. An L-type firm, therefore,
can signal its type by issuing bonds ex ante that promise a total coupon
payment of (c2 + bL)dt. Recall that in the previous subsection, the only
heterogeneity across both types of firms was the operating leverage. The
debt contract of Section 2.2 promised a constant coupon of c2dt for both
types. Therefore, bL denotes the amount of coupon paid by the L type firm
to separate itself from an H type firm. An L type firm can signal its type by
setting bL such that an H type firm has no incentive to mimic. Specifically,
bL should be set such that, when mimicked, an H type firm optimally leaves
at its duopoly trigger. This requires that
x1r < x¯
H
2r (18)
where x¯H2r is the reservation trigger of an H type firm if it mimics an L type
firm. Condition (18) restores the competitive advantage of firm 1 over an
H type firm. In particular, firm 1 can again use the information revelation
strategy outlined in Proposition 2.
11Recall, however, that the uninformed firm knows distribution of its rival’s operating
leverage.
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A second requirement for a separating debt contract is that an L type firm
does not lose its competitive advantage over firm 1. Proposition 4 showed
that this will be the case so long as the reservation trigger of an L type firm
is below that of firm 1:
x¯Lr ≤ x1r (19)
where x¯Lr is the reservation trigger of an L type firm when the firm issues
a debt contract with coupon c2 + bL. Combining conditions (18) and (19)
yields the Proposition 5.
Proposition 5: A separating debt contract issued ex ante by an L type
firm must satisfy:
(ω1 − ω¯H)(1 − α)rS < bL ≤ (ω1 − ω¯L)(1− α)rS + (f1 − fL) + (c1 − c2)(20)
Proof: The proof follows from straightforward substitution for x1d, x¯H2r and
x¯L2r.
Proposition 5 suggests that operating efficiency increases debt capacity of
the firm allowing it to issue more debt ex ante: note that the upper bound
on bL is increasing in the difference of operating leverages of firm 1 and type
L firm 2. Put differently, this result shows how product market competi-
tion can constrain the use of debt for other corporate purposes. A small
magnitude of this difference might imply that the firm faces a tradeoff be-
tween addressing the free cash flow problem and maintaining its competitive
position in the product markets.
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3 Economic Implications and Risk Analysis
This section aims to assess the significance of the results proposed in
Section 2 and to derive economic implications. Three broad questions are
addressed through simulations. First, how do firm values respond to changes
in crucial parameters of the model? Of particular interest is the effect of
information asymmetry on the value of the uninformed firm. Second, I
investigate the relation between operating and financial leverage and analyze
corresponding empirical predictions. Finally, I define and show the risk
implications of the model. The parameter values used in the analysis are
given in Appendix B.
3.1 Implications for Firm Value
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of information asymmetry on the value
of the uninformed firm 1 for various values of the probability of an L type
rival. Panel A of Figure 2 conditions on an L type firm. The graph is
divided into four regions separated by the exit triggers x1m < xL2d < x
H
2d.
The firm values are are identical in the regions in which xt < xH2d. This
is because all information asymmetry is resolved below xH2d. However, for
xt ≥ xH2d, the uninformed firm 1 value is an expectation over types. Several
observations are salient in Panel A. First, the figure exhibits a nonmonotonic
relation between firm value and the extent of information asymmetry. The
extent of information asymmetry is greatest at p = 0.5. Note that firm
value when p = 0.5 is between those when p = 1 and p = 0.2. Second,
when p = 1, that is, when firm 1 knows the rival’s type is L, firm 1 value
is continuous as shown by the dotted line in the figure. On the other hand,
when there is information asymmetry, firm 1 value jumps at the exit trigger
of an H type firm, xH2d. The size of the jump increases in the probability
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Figure 2: Effect of Information Asymmetry on Uninformed Firm Value.
Panels A and B show the case F1 < Fk, k ∈ {L,H}. Panel C shows
information revelation conditional on type L rival.
of an H type firm, 1 − p. By attaching a higher probability to an H type
rival, firm 1 weighs the prospect of becoming a monopolist at an earlier
date, xH2d, relatively high. As firm 1 finds out that the rival is type L at
xH2d, the adjustment to firm value becomes more drastic. For instance, when
p = 0.5, the adjustment to firm value is about 11% whereas when p = 0.2,
the adjustment is as high as 22%. If one interprets p as the common prior
of firm 1 about the rival’s type, this observation shows the significance and
value of information held by competitors in product markets. Finally, note
that for large values of xt, the value functions close in on each other since, at
this range, firm 1 is far from the duopoly exit trigger xH2d and the probability
of becoming a monopolist soon is relatively low. The pattern of adjustment
is reversed when one conditions on an H type firm. Panel B of Figure 2
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Figure 3: Type L Firm 2 Equity Value with and without Signaling. The
parameters are μ = −0.01, σ = 0.2, r = 0.05, α = 0.05,Π = 2, π = 1, S =
20, f1 = 2, c1 = 5, fL = 1, cL = 4, fH = 2, cH = 5.
depicts this case. Analogous to Panel A, the graph is divided into three
regions separated by xH2d where information asymmetry is resolved and x1m
where firm 1 optimally leaves the market. In this case, p = 0 corresponds
to the perfect information setting in which firm 1 knows that the rival is
a highly leveraged firm. This is shown by long dashed lines in the figure.
When p = 0, firm 1 value is continuous. However, when there is information
asymmetry, firm 1 value experiences an upward adjustment at xH2d as it finds
out the rival’s type. This is because, before xH2d is hit, firm 1 value takes
into consideration the likelihood that the rival might be a low leveraged firm.
The value adjustment at xH2d is upward since the firm becomes a monopolist
at an earlier time relative to the case in which the rival is a low leveraged
firm. In other words, firm 1 receives either good or bad news when xH2d is
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hit. In the case of Panel B, the news is good since the rival turns out to
be a high-leverage firm. As in Panel A, the adjustment to value in Panel
B is significant. When p = 0.5, the jump in value is approximately 13%.
A similar pattern is observed in Panel C of Figure 2 when F1 ∈ (FL, FH)
and x1d < xH2r so that the revelation strategy as outlined in Proposition 2
can be used. The figure conditions on the ex post realization of an L type
rival. The graph with the dashed lines shows the perfect information case
in which p = 1. In that case, firm 1 value is continuous and given simply
by its duopoly value without any strategic interaction terms.12 When there
is information asymmetry, firm 1 learns the rival’s type at xH2d = 2.90 and
firm value is adjusted accordingly. As with Panels A and B, the adjustment
at xH2d is significant.
Proposition 5 derives the conditions for the debt contract that reveals firm
type when the uninformed firm’s total leverage is equivalent to that of the
highly levered firm 2 and the uninformed firm’s expected value from follow-
ing the monopoly strategy is higher than that from exiting at the duopoly
trigger. Figure 3 assesses the significance of the debt contract suggested by
Proposition 5. Type L firm 2 equity value without signaling is shown by the
dashed curve in the figure. The dotted and the solid curves show the equity
value of the signaling firm with two different levels of coupon. As expected,
signaling increases the equity value of the type L firm. This arises mainly
from the fact that the type L firm becomes a monopolist at an earlier date
when it reveals its type. Given the parameter set of Figure 3, type L firm 2
becomes a monpolist when the shock process hits 3 rather than 1.5 without
signaling. In addition, the increase in the equity value is more significant
when bL is chosen closer to the lower bound in Proposition 5. For instance,
12Refer to Proposition 1, equation (4).
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choosing bL = 0.5 rather than bL = 1.5 leads to a 40% higher value at the
exit of firm 1 at x1d.
3.2 Firm Leverage and Exit
The model developed in the paper defines firm leverage broadly as the
sum of financial leverage and operating leverage. Operating leverage, at the
same time, is the proxy for firm efficiency. In particular, it can be thought
of as a measure indicating how well the firm manages its supply chain and
networks or as a measure of production costs. Although all these relate to
real decisions of the firm as opposed to financial decisions, they represent a
fixed outlay for the firm as long as it operates. Therefore, it is analogous to
financial leverage.
In addition, operating leverage is often a consequence of the technology
choice of the firm. A change in technology can prove to be a difficult deci-
sion: it may involve a large, irreversible lump-sum investment cost as well
as adjustment costs and may require ongoing R&D activities prior to the
switch. Compared to a firm’s financial leverage, therefore, changes in oper-
ating leverage are more costly and likely to be infrequent.13 Recall also that
total firm leverage determines the competitive strength of the firm. That
is, firm i outlasts firm j so long as ci + fi = Fi < Fj = cj + fj. Therefore,
particularly in concentrated industries in which firms may have incentives
to induce the exit of their rivals, a firm’s financial leverage choice is con-
strained both by its technology choice and the leverage of its rivals. To see
this, suppose that fj < fi. If it turns out that cj − ci > fi − fj, a more
efficient firm will be driven out of the market due to excessive leverage since
13This is not to say that changes in financial leverage can be carried out easily at no
cost. See, among others, Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) for a transaction-cost-based
explanation.
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Fi < Fj . Equivalently, for firm j to attain or maintain a competitive edge
over the rival, the portion of total leverage accounted for by debt, cj/Fj ,
must be bounded by Fi/Fj − fj/Fj .
Several testable implications emerge out of this. First, changes in a firm’s
technology and/or innovations that increase firm efficiency are expected to
precipitate a rise in financial leverage. Similarly, the financial leverage of
a firm is expected to increase subsequent to a major competitor’s exit or
contraction. This hypothesis is the result of two effects following a rival’s
exit. First, the firm’s financial leverage is no longer constrained by the
rival firm’s leverage. Second, due to the exit of the rival, the firm can
experience an increase in its profitability, which, in turn, can lead to a
rise in financial leverage. At the industry level, the model predicts that
firms’ financial leverage moves together as increases (decreases) in the rival
firms’ debt relaxes (tightens) the constraint on other firms’ financial leverage,
ceteris paribus. Another policy implication is that firms with relatively high
debt levels are expected to invest more in measures that can increase firm
efficiency. This effect should be stronger in concentrated industries: as
Zingales (1998) and Khanna and Tice (2005) point out, in concentrated
industries with less levered rivals, predatory pricing can be observed. The
effect should also be observed more strongly for firms that are financially
constrained and unable to renegotiate the debt contract.
3.3 Implications for Firm Risk
In a previous paper, Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) develop a
model in which a time-varying risk structure can be tied to the size and book-
to-market factors through operating leverage and the real options of the firm.
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The aim of this section is to analyze the dynamic risk structure of firms. The
main emphasis is on how information asymmetry and information revelation
impact the risk dynamics of the uninformed firm. I also investigate the role
of signaling on risk dynamics of the signaling firm. As will be seen, the risk
dynamics will not only reflect the book-to-market and size effects but also
the impact of information asymmetry and product market competition.
Firm risk is defined as in previous research by Carlson, Fisher, and Gi-
ammarino (2004) and Carlson, Dockner, Fisher, and Giammarino (2009).
It measures the sensitivity of firm value with respect to changing demand
conditions in the product markets. More formally, firm risk, β, is defined
as:
βti =
∂Vi(x)
∂x
x
Vi(x)
(21)
where Vi(x) = Ei(x) + Di(x), i = 1, 2 is the total firm value.
Note that, in this formulation, market conditions as measured by the
movements in stochastic demand acts as the main risk factor. As opposed to
most models in the literature pioneered by Berk, Green, and Naik (1999),14
the model presented in this paper considers financially leveraged firms. This
structure allows one to depict a fuller characterization of a firm’s time-
varying risk dynamics or cost of capital. To see this, define firm i’s equity
and debt betas as:
βei =
∂Ei(x)
∂x
x
Ei(x)
(22)
14See Introduction for a discussion of this literature.
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and
βdi =
∂Di(x)
∂x
x
Di(x)
(23)
Simple manipulation of the expression for βti using equations (22) and
(23) yields:
βti =
E
D + E
βei +
D
D + E
βdi
= weβei + wdβ
d
i (24)
Equation (24) relates total firm risk or its asset beta to its two main
components represented by the two groups of claimholders. Specifically,
firm i’s asset beta changes as the market risks of its equityholders (βei ) and
debtholders (βdi ) change, weighted by their respective fractions held in the
firm.
For expositional purposes, Proposition 6 derives the risk dynamics of only
the uninformed firm 1 when it strictly dominates the rival firm of either
type. Since the functional form of firm β is similar in all cases, Proposition
6 reflects risk dynamics in all the other cases as well.
Proposition 6: Suppose F1 < Fk, k = L,H and let βt1 and β
e
1 denote firm
1 total and equity risk, respectively. Then
(i) firm 1 total risk and equity risk, conditional on type L competitor, is
given by:
βt1(x) = 1 +
f1/r
V1(x)
− (1− λ2) A
V1(x)
xλ2 − (1− λ2) C
V1(x)
xλ2
−(1− λ2) D
V1(x)
[
pxL2d
(
x
xL2d
)λ2
+ qxH2d
(
x
xH2d
)λ2]
(25)
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βe1(x) = 1 +
F1/r
E1(x)
− (1− λ2) C
E1(x)
xλ2
−(1− λ2) D
E1(x)
[
pxL2d
(
x
xL2d
)λ2
+ qxH2d
(
x
xH2d
)λ2]
(26)
in the region xt ≥ xH2d. In the region xt ∈ [xL2d, xH2d], firm 1 risk is:
βt1(x) = 1 +
f1/r
V1(x)
− (1− λ2) A
V1(x)
xλ2 − (1− λ2) C
V1(x)
xλ2
−(1− λ2) D
V1(x)
xL2d
(
x
xL2d
)λ2
(27)
βe1(x) = 1 +
F1/r
E1(x)
− (1− λ2) C
E1(x)
xλ2
−(1− λ2) D
E1(x)
xL2d
(
x
xL2d
)λ2
(28)
When firm 1 operates as a monopolist in the region xt ∈ [x1m, xL2d], its risk
is given by:
βt1(x) = 1 +
f1/r
V1(x)
− (1− λ2) A
V1(x)
xλ2 − (1− λ2) C
V1(x)
xλ2 (29)
βe1(x) = 1 +
F1/r
E1(x)
− (1− λ2) C
E1(x)
xλ2 (30)
(ii) firm 1 total risk and equity risk, conditional on type H rival, are given
by equations (25) and (26) in the region xt ≥ xH2d and equations (29) and
(30) in the region xt ∈ [x1m, xH2d].
Proof: The proof follows from taking derivatives of value functions pro-
vided in Proposition 1.
Proposisiton 6 highlights the major factors that determine the dynamic
risk structure of firms. It also shows how information asymmetry and learn-
ing change risk dynamics. The first component in all equations is called the
revenue beta, which is normalized to 1. The second component in equations
(25)-(30) reflects the contribution from firm leverage. Operating leverage
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is positively related to total firm risk as well as equity risk. On the other
hand, financial leverage is risk-increasing only for equity risk. As in Carl-
son, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004), this component captures the book-to-
market effect. The terms that follow the first two components pertain to
the effect of the exit option held by the firm. The third term in total firm
risk, βt1(x), shows the impact of the exit option through debt value. Recall,
from equation (3), that A ≤ 0. If A < 0, then the the impact of the exit
option on firm value is risk increasing through debt value. On the other
hand, when A = 0, total firm risk is unaffected by movements in demand
conditions. Note that A = 0 when the salvage value of the firm is suffi-
ciently high so that debtholders fully recover their claim. Since debtholders
retrieve the full claim in the event of exit by equityholders, debt value is
not affected by movements in product market conditions. Note also that
this effect is absent altogether in equity risk, βe1(x). As in Carlson, Dockner,
Fisher, and Giammarino (2009), both firm’s own exit option and the com-
petitor’s exit option reduce risk. In other words, competition reduces both
firm and equity risk by alleviating the effects of a demand shock. Although
lower demand reduces the revenues generated by a particular firm, it also
increases the likelihood that the competitor will leave the market, thereby
mildening the effect of the negative shock.
The effect of information asymmetry and option exercise can be seen in
Proposition 6 as well as Figure 4. Panels A (B) in Figure 4 illustrates
total firm 1 risk conditional on a type L (H) rival. Equations (25) and (26)
show that firm 1’s risk is affected by the extent of information asymmetry.
Before rival firm type is revealed through the option exercise at xH2d, firm 1
weighs the possibility that the rival can be of either type. As in the analysis
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of value functions in Section 3.1, the relation between firm risk and the
extent of information asymmetry is not monotonic. Recall that the extent
of information asymmetry is greatest when p = 0.5. Both panels of Figure
4 show that if firm 1 has a prior attaching a higher probability to an L-type
firm, the size of the jump in firm risk decreases.
Figure 4 also shows that firm risk decreases as demand conditions worsen
when xt ≥ xH2d. At xH2d, firm 1 finds out rival firm type and firm risk jumps.
Since Panel A assumes a type L rival, firm 1 continues to operate as a
duopolist as long as xt hits the duopoly exit trigger of the L-type rival, xL2d.
Firm risk in this region follows a similar pattern to that before xt hits xH2d.
When type L firm leaves the market at xL2d, there is another upward jump
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in firm risk. The same observations can be made in Panel B when firm 1
faces an H-type rival. In sum, option exercise manifests itself as jumps in
firm risk.
Figure 5 compares firm 1 risk with that of type L firm risk when infor-
mation revelation takes place in the no-dominance case. The solid curves
depict the risk structure of firm 1 while the dashed curves indicate that of
type L firm 2. Recall from Proposition 2 that firm 1 learns rival type through
the revelation strategy at the duopoly exit trigger of the high-leverage firm,
xH2d. Accordingly, firm 1 risk jumps at x
H
2d. As in Figure 4, rival action or
inaction leads to a change in firm 1 risk. Type L firm 2 risk, on the other
hand, follows a similar pattern observed in Figure 4. As the state variable
approaches the exit trigger of firm 1, firm 2 risk declines. At the exit trigger
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Figure 6: Firm 1 and Firm L Risk with and without Signaling.
of firm 1, firm 2 risk jumps upward.
Panels A and B of Figure 6 explore the risk structure of type L firm 2 and
firm 1 in the signaling case, respectively. Recall that signaling takes place
when F1 = FH and expected firm 1 value from waiting in the market beyond
its duopoly exit trigger exceeds that from leaving the market at x1d. The
dashed curves in both panels depict risk structure without signaling. In this
case, type L firm 2 becomes a monopolist only at xH2r as opposed to x1d. The
risk dynamics are similar with and without signaling. Firm risk decreases
as the state variable approaches the exit trigger and jumps at the trigger.
Turning to firm 1 risk, one observes that for large values of demand shock,
xt, firm risk is similar with and without the signaling contract of type L
firm. However, as the state variable approaches the respective exit triggers,
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firm risks diverge.
4 Conclusion
The empirical literature has shown the importance of the interaction be-
tween the capital structure choice and efficiency for a firm’s product market
behavior and the contraction and exit decisions. The evidence also suggests
that aggregate factors such as business cycles and industry features play
a crucial role as their impact differs across firms. This paper develops a
model that brings all these features together and analyzes the product mar-
ket competition with asymmetric information. The model illustrates how
firm-specific factors such as the debt, the efficiency and the quality of infor-
mation held about the rivals affect the exit decision in various competitive
environments. The relative position of a firm in terms of debt and efficiency
is an important determinant of the exit decision.
The model explains the role information asymmetry in the product mar-
kets. It shows that information asymmetry not only affects the outcome of
the product market competition but also contributes significantly to the firm
value and the risk dynamics. In particular, product market behavior carries
valuable information that can potentially change investors’ beliefs about a
firm’s future stream of cash flows. This, in turn, implies that the cross-
section of average stock returns are sensitive to the competitors’ product
market policies.
Consistent with the empirical literature, the model predicts that a firm’s
total leverage is positively related to the probability of exit. The model dis-
tinguishes between the financial and the operating leverage. This distinction
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allows one to link the exit decision explicitly to its drivers. Specifically, the
model shows that a relatively high level of debt can lead a firm to shut
down sooner. This result is consistent with the evidence in Khanna and
Tice (2005) and Zingales (1998). An important consequence of this result
is that the rival firms’ leverage imposes a constraint on a firm’s capital
structure choice. Furthermore, the model also generates a number of other
predictions. First, it predicts that the incumbent firms’ debt is expected to
increase following the exit or the contraction of the rival firms. Second, the
firms’ debt levels are expected to move together over time as the rival firms’
changes in their debt either tightens or relaxes the constraint on a firm’s
capital structure choice.
The model can be extended along several dimensions. A first step can
be to incorporate the product market pricing. In the reduced form model
of this paper, it is not clear how information asymmetry affects the pricing
decisions. Such an extension would also generate empirical predictions that
can be compared with the existing evidence in the literature. Second, the
model has the potential to investigate the impact of other firm-specific fea-
tures. Heterogeneous salvage values, for instance, would allow one to model
how the possibility of fire sales relate to the exit decisions. The model as-
sumes that a firm’s ability to control its costs is the proxy for its efficiency.
An alternative view of efficiency focuses on the firm’s ability to generate
cash flows from its asset base. Such alternative proxies can easily be in-
corporated into the model. Third, the distributional assumptions on the
information asymmetry can be relaxed or information asymmetry can be
assumed to be reciprocal. However, the qualitative results of the model are
unlikely to change as a consequence. Finally, the capital structure choice in
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the model is a static decision of the firm. An interesting extension would be
to characterize the changes in capital structure and link it to the product
market competition.
Appendix
Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: To derive debt and equity values, I first value
a generic contingent claim, φ(x), that promises its holder a net cash flow of
g(x). Then I relate this value to debt and equity values.
Assuming complete markets, the no-arbitrage condition yields:
rφdt = gdt + E(dφ) (31)
Using Itoˆ’s lemma and taking expectations,
1
2
σ2x2φ
′′
+ μxφ
′ − rφ + g = 0 (32)
The general solution to 32 is of the form:
φ(x) = A0 + A1xλ1 + A2xλ2 (33)
where λ1 and λ2 are the roots of the following characteristic equation ob-
tained by plugging in the conjectured solution into the 32:
λ1 =
1
2
− μ
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− μ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
> 1
λ2 =
1
2
− μ
σ2
−
√(
1
2
− μ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
< 0
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(34)
In equation (33), A0, A1 and A2 are constants to be determined from the
boundary conditions.
To value debt, Dk(x), note that the debt contract promises a constant
payment of ckdt until the firm exits the market. Hence, g(x) = ck. To obtain
the coefficients in equation (33), impose the following boundary conditions:
limx→∞Dk(x) =
ck
r
Dk(xk) = min[(1− α)S, ckr ]
}
(35)
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where xk, k = i, j is the trigger at which equityholders leave the market.
Note that this trigger is exogenous from the perspective of debtholders.
The first of the boundary conditions tells that as xt tends to infinity, the
value of debt approaches the present value of coupon payments discounted
at the risk-free rate since for large xt, the probability of an eventual exit
diminishes. The second boundary condition regulates the behavior of debt
value when the firm exits the market. Using these boundary conditions
yields the debt value in equations (2) and (3).
Before deriving equity value, it is useful to obtain an expression for
the portion of salvage value equityholders retain upon exit. The second
boundary condition in (35) indicates that if min[(1 − α)S, ckr ] = ckr , then
the resale value of assets is sufficiently high so that equityholders retrieve
the value (1 − α)S − ckr , which, in turn, implies ωk(ck) = (1 − α) − ckrS . If,
on the other hand, min[(1 − α)S, ckr ] = (1 − α)S, then the salvage value
accrues to debtholders and equityholders receive nothing upon exit. In this
case, ωk(ck) = 0.
Now consider the equity value of the firm that leaves the market first,
firm j. In this case, g(x) = πx−Fj . To solve the differential in (32), impose
the following boundary conditions:
limx→∞Ej(x) =
πx
r − μ −
Fj
r
Ej(xjd) = ωj(1− α)S
∂Ej(xjd)
∂x
= 0
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
(36)
The first of the boundary conditions is similar to that described for the
debt value. The second boundary condition is the so-called value-matching
condition which states that at the point of exit, equity value is simply equal
to the salvage value recovered by equityholders. The third condition is the
smooth-pasting condition that ensures the optimality of the exit trigger.
Solving equation (32) subject to the boundary conditions in (36) gives the
equity value in (4) and the exit trigger in (5).
To derive Eid(x) in equation (8), impose the following boundary condi-
tions:
lim
x→∞Eid(x) =
πx
r − μ −
Fi
r
(37)
Eid(xjd) = Eim(xjd) (38)
Note that in equation (38), the duopoly equity value of firm i is partly
determined by the action its rival takes. This is captured by the second
boundary condition. At xjd, firm j leaves the market, which entitles firm
i to monopoly profits. Hence, the second boundary condition ensures that
equity value is continuous by equating Eid(x) to Eim(x) at xjd. After firm
42
j has exited the market, firm i becomes a monopolist and its value satisfies
again equation (32) with the following boundary conditions:
lim
x→∞Eim(x) =
Πx
r − μ −
Fi
r
(39)
Eim(xim) = ωiS (40)
∂Ei(xim)
∂x
= 0 (41)
Solving equations (32), (38) and (41) delivers the third part of Proposition
1.
Proof of Proposition 2: Before deriving the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE), it is useful to describe the game in more detail. The game can
be modelled as a dynamic game of incomplete information in which the
informed firm 2 sends a signal to the uninformed firm 1 by either exiting or
staying in the market at the duopoly exit trigger of an H type firm, xH2d. In
the sequel, let M = {m2L,m2H} denote the set of signals sent by the type
L and type H firm 2, respectively. Hence, the set M = {ne, e}, for instance,
corresponds to a setting in which a type L firm does not exit at xH2d but an
type H firm does.
Firm 1’s strategy space maps the signal sent by firm 2 to its action space.
Let A = {ane, ae} denote the action taken by firm 1 upon observing no exit
(ane) and exit (ae) at the duopoly trigger xH2d. Once firm 1 observes rival
firm behavior at xH2d, it chooses whether to exit at its duopoly trigger, x1d,
or the monopoly trigger, x1m.
The next step is to define the conditional probabilities firm 1 uses upon
observing firm 2’s signal. Let r denote the probability that the rival firm
is type L given that no exit has occurred at xH2d. Similarly, s denotes the
conditional probability of an L type rival when firm 2 exits at xH2d.
Let τH = inf
{
t : xt = xH2d
}
be an adapted stopping time denoting the
time at which the state variable first hits xH2d. Consider the following strategy
for firm 1: (a) wait until xτH = x
H
2d, (b) if at xτH = x
H
2d, firm 2 has not exited,
leave the market at x1d, (c) otherwise exit the market at x1m. In other words,
firm 1 plays A = {x1d, x1m}. I now determine firms’ best responses to each
other under this scheme and argue that these best responses constitute the
dominant strategies for each firm.
(1) First, consider type H firm 2. Since F1 < FH , by the strict mono-
tonicity of the reservation triggers in the fixed costs, firm 1 can make a
credible threat to type H firm 2 by holding on until x1r < xH2r. Note also
that type H firm 2 cannot mimic type L firm 2 since this requires that type H
firm 2 wait credibly at least until x1d. But x1d < xH2r by assumption. Hence,
type H firm 2 would always leave the market at its duopoly trigger, xH2d. In
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other words, playing xH2d is a dominant strategy for the H type firm.
15
Now, consider type L firm 2. Since we have xL2r < x1r no matter what
strategy firm 1 follows, the best response of type L firm 2 would be to leave
the market at its monopoly trigger, xL2m. Hence, exiting at x
L
2m is a dominant
strategy for a type L firm 2. Note that the ongoing discussion implies the
types play a separating strategy and hence, r = 1 and s = 0.
(2) We now argue that the above profile outlined for firm 1 is the best
response to firm 2 strategies. Observe that for xt > xH2d, firm 1 does not
commit itself to any strategy. Suppose now that xτH = x
H
2d. Since regardless
of firm 1 strategy, type H(L) firm 2 will leave the market at its duopoly
(monopoly) trigger, firm 1 finds out firm 2 type by observing firm 2 action
at xH2d. If firm 2 has exited, firm 1 finds out that the competitor is of type
H and leaves the market at x1m by Proposition 1. If no exit has occurred
at this point, firm 1 deduces that the competitor is of type L and thus exits
at x1d. Not only is {x1d, x1m} the best response to firm 2 strategies but it
is also the dominant strategy for firm 1. To see why, note that if the rival
firm exits at xH2d, playing x1m dominates x1d by Proposition 1. If firm 2 has
not exited at xH2d, playing x1d dominates playing x1m since by assumption
x1d < x
H
2r and only an L type firm would remain in the market for xt < x
H
2r.
In this case, since an L type firm plays its dominant strategy of xL2m, firm 1
would exit at x1d,∀r ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, the firms play their respective dominant strategies and the set
{{ne, e} , {x1d, x1m} , r = 1, s = 0} constitute a PBE.
Proof of Proposition 3: The structure of the game is similar to the
one described for Proposition 2. Note, however, that although the signal
space remains the same as in Proposition 2, the action space for firm 1 now
depends on the signal sent by firm 2. If firm 1 has observed exit at xHd , its
decision is to choose whether to exit at x1d or at x1m. On the other hand,
if firm 1 observes no exit behavior at xHd , it decides whether to exit when
xt hits x1d, or to wait until xHr in order to reveal rival firm type. As in
Proposition 2, however, if firm 2 exits at xH2d, playing x1m is the dominant
strategy for firm 1. Therefore, in the sequel, I only consider firm 1 strategies
of the form {ane, x1m}.
Consider the case in which firm 2 has not exited at xH2d. We ask whether
there exists a belief, r, that justifies firm 1’s exit at the duopoly trigger x1d,
thereby leading a type H firm 2 to become a monopolist.16
Consider the strategy {x1d, x1m} for firm 1. The expected payoff from
this strategy is E1d(x) given in equation (4) since an L type rival would play
15It might happen that an H type firm trembles and does not leave at xH2d. But in
this case, the dominant strategy for the H type firm would be to leave the market at
xH2d − ,  > 0.
16Recall that the working assumption is xH2r ≤ x1d. Therefore, it pays the H type firm
to hold on to the market until firm exits at x1d to capture monopoly rents.
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its dominating strategy of leaving at xL2m and an H type competitor would
prefer to stay in the market beyond x1d since x1d ≥ xH2r by assumption.
Now consider the strategy
{
xH2r, x1m
}
. If firm 1 faces an L type rival,
firm 2 would not exit at xH2r and firm 1 would exit the market at x
H
2r as a
duopolist. Hence its value would be E1d(x;xH2r) where the value function is
as given in equation (4) but with the exit trigger x1d replaced with xH2r. On
the other hand, an H type rival would exit by xH2d− ,  > 0 to cut its losses.
This yields the value EH1d(x) given in equation (8). Hence, the expected
equity value from this strategy is:
rE1d(x;xH2r) + (1− r)EH1d(x) (42)
Given the above expected values, firm 1 would perefer to leave at x1d if
E1d(x) is greater than the expression in (42). Manipulating this expression
then yields:
r ≥ E
H
1d(x)− E1d(x)
EH1d(x)− E1d(x;xH2r)
(43)
If firm 1 plays the above strategy, the best response of an L type firm
2 is to play its dominant strategy of xL2m while an H type firm plays x
H
2m
since xH2r ≤ x1d by assumption. This implies that firm 1’s updated beliefs
about an L type firm after observing no exit at xH2d, r, is given by the an-
terior probability p. Hence, the profile {{ne, ne} , {x1d, x1m} , r = p} would
constitute a pooling PBE if p satisfies equation (16).
Proof of Proposition 4: To prove part (i) of the proposition, distinguish
between three cases depending on whether firm 2 types play separating or
pooling strategies.
(1) Suppose that both types play xkd, k = L,H, that is, both types exit
at their respective duopoly triggers. Since x1m  x1r  x1d < xkd, k =
L,H, firm 1 prefers to stay until its monopoly trigger. That is, exiting at
the monopoly trigger, x1m, is the best response of firm 1. This is easy to
see. Once firm 2 leaves the market at its duopoly trigger, firm 1 becomes
the monopolist. Proposition 1 shows that when firm 1 is a monopolist, it
maximizes its value if it waits until x1m. Now suppose that firm 1 indeed
stays until x1m. As argued above, firm 2 would be willing to incur losses
until xkr to become a monopolist. However, by the strict monotonicity of
reservation triggers in the firm leverage, firm 1 can make a credible threat
to firm 2 by holding on to the market until x1r. Given this, firm 2 would
cut its losses and exit at the duopoly threshold. Hence the above profile
constitues a fixed point and is therefore an PBE.
(2) Assume now that both types of firm 2 play xkm. It is evident that if
x1r < x
k
m and/or x1d < x
k
r , firm 2 would never play x
k
m, since firm 1 in
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either case can hold on to the market longer than its competitor. However,
even if x1m < xkr < x1d, 17 by the strict monotonicity of xir in Fi, we have
x1r < x
k
r , k = L,H. That is, firm 1 can again hold out longer than firm 2
to reap off monopoly profits. Hence, the best response of firm 1 is to stay
until x1m. But since the best response of type k firm 2 is to exit at xkd, there
cannot be any equilibrium with firm 1 leaving first when both types of firm
2 play xkm.
(3) It could also be that type L firm plays xL2m and type H plays x
H
2d and
vice versa. However, the arguments in (2) establish that as long as x1r < xkr ,
firm 1 can always outlast firm 2 no matter what type it is. Therefore, there
cannot be any equilibrium involving firm 1 leaving first when types play
separating strategies.
It is straightforward to prove part (ii) of the proposition using the same
arguments as in part (i). The proof again rests on the strict monotonicity
of the reservation triggers in the fixed costs.
17That is, firm 2 could hold out until the duopoly trigger of firm 1 if it could become
the monopolist.
46
Appendix B. Parameter Values
Table 1: Parameter Values for Figures 2-6
Parameter
Figure 2
Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6
Panel A&B Panel C
μ 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
σ 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.30
r 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
α 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Π 2 2 2 2 5 5
π 1 1 1 1 1 1
S 20 20 20 20 20 20
f1 2 3.5 2 1 2 2
c1 2 2 4 1 3.5 5
fL 1.5 2 1 2 1 1
fH 2.5 3 2 4 2 3
c2 4 3 4 3 4 4
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